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In the Supre1ne Court 
of the State of Utah 
Robert S. Burton, Adininistrator 
of the Estate of ADELINE G. 
BURTON, Deceased, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ZIONS COOPERATIVE MERCAN-
TILE INSTITUTION, also known as 
Z. C. M. I., a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 7854 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees generally with the state-
ment of facts by the appellant, except that it should be 
pointed out that after the discharge of the prospective 
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4 
juror, Barker, the case proceded to trial before a jury, 
duly sworn and regularly impaneled, and resulted in a 
judgment on a verdict in favor of the respondent of no 
cause of action ( R. 15). 
STATEMENTS OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
WHERE, AS HERE, THERE IS NO PROOF SHOWING 
PREJUDICE TO APPELLANT OR ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
BY THE TRIAL COURT, THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION 
FOR A MISTRIAL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent has examined carefully the argument 
advanced by appellant in support of his appeal and has 
concluded that the entire argument is based upon un-
warranted assumptions of fact and an inaccurate and 
incorrect application of the principles of law involved 
in this case. 
Throughout appellant's brief it appears to be 
assumed, as a proven fact, that the jury was influenced 
by the statements made by the prospective juror, Barker, 
and that the jury which was ultimately selected to try 
the case must be presumed to have disregarded its oath 
and to have decided the case under the influence of ele-
ments outside the evidence presented to the jury for 
consideration. There is no support in the record for 
such an assumption. 
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It is submitted that this Court should not assurne 
that the jury was prejudiced by any extrinsic matters 
unless there is some showing or some fact presented 
from which such prejudice may be inferred. To indulge 
in such an assumption without a showing of prejudice 
is, in effect, to nullify the regular and orderly proceed-
ings utilized in the impaneling of a jury and to presume 
that the jury was selected without the usual safeguards 
employed by courts, and that after selection, the jury 
wantonly disregarded the oath administered under the 
provisions of Rule 47(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant asks this Court to indulge in this assumrp-
tion although, from the record, it is worth noting that 
appellant did not object to the statements made by the 
prospective juror, nor did appellant request that the 
Court admonish the jury to pay no attention to such 
statement. It is likewise worth noting that the jury, 
having been finally impaneled, was passed for cause 
by a;ppellant and no attempt was made to challenge any 
juror for cause or to inquire of individual jurors whether 
any of them possessed such a state of mind as would 
prevent him from acting impartially and without pre-
. judice to the substantial rights of the appellant. The 
appellant had such a right under the provisions of Rule 
47 (f) (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and since 
the record is ·silent, it must be presumed that appellant 
did not avail himself of the opportunities afforded under 
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6 
that rule. While the record is silent on this point, it is 
a fact, as appellant knows, that the jury was passed for 
cause without comment by a;ppellant. 
On page 5 of appellant's brief the statement is 
made that '' ... the conduct and argument of the pros-
pective juror was calculated to and did influence the 
verdict of the jury.'' On page 13, it is claimed that the 
record seems to indicate that "he had more than a 
passing interest in the case.'' Now here in the record 
can there be found any basis for such bald assertions. 
No claim was ever presented to the lower Court that 
prospective juror Barker, designedly, or with '' calcula-
tion,'' made his remarks for the pur~ose of influencing 
the jury in favor of the respondent. Now here can an 
iota of proof be found to show that Barker knew any-
thing about the case, or that he knew which insurance 
company was involved, or that he had any connection 
with the case. Appellant, having presented no proof 
and having made no attempt to develop facts in search 
of proof, now seeks to supply the elements which he 
lacks by resort to sweeping assertions and thinly-veiled 
innuendo. Appellant, by such argument, cannot escape 
the fundamental rule of law that where "the possibility 
of prejudice is not even vaguely discernible, it will not 
be presumed.'' Redd vs. Airway Motor Oo(wh Lines, Inc., 
104 Utah 9, 137 Pacific 2nd 374. 
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The only case brought to the attention of this Court 
by the appellant as bearing on this question is the case 
of Hudson, et al, Ys. Roos, 76 :Mich. 173, 42 N.W. 1099 
(not 1049, as cited by appellant). That case is not even 
remotely in point in this action. It was a case decided 
in 1889 by the Supreme Court of Michigan, and the 
principal point arose when counsel for plaintiffs, in 
examining the jury, made a long speech in which he out-
lined thoroughly the full particulars of the plaintiffs' 
claim and then, in the words of the court, ''took it upon 
himself to give his version of the defense that would be 
set up.'' Counsel commented upon every fact in the 
case and \Yas able to do so with familiarity because of 
the fact that the case had been tried once before. He 
minimized the effect of defendant's claims and dwelt 
at length upon the facts favorable to plaintiffs and upon 
the virtues of plaitiffs' claims. In deciding the case, the 
Court stated: 
''By this practice the counsel for the plaintiffs 
was enabled to get four arguments to the jury-
one before they were sworn and three after-
wards, at least one more than he was entitled 
to. This should not have been permitted by the 
Court. The attention of the Circuit Judge was 
called to it in the beginning, and his failure to 
keep the counsel within bounds was prejudicial 
error.'' 
It is submitted that the Hudson case and the refer-
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ences to annotations in A. L. R., as submitted by appel-
lant, are not in point. The A. L. R. annotations are found 
at 46 A. L. R. 1509, et seq., and 73 A. L. R. 89, and the 
cases therein discussed are concerned either with 
''chance'' verdicts or with misconduct of jurors after 
they have been sworn and impaneled to try the case, 
and usually the fact situations involved related to the 
attempts by jurors to influence the verdict by bringing 
personal experience to bear upon the facts of the case 
which had been submitted to them. Thus, wherever the 
practice of the Court allowed affidavits of jurors to im-
peach the verdict of the jury, the courts have held that 
such conduct on the part of a sworn juror was an ohvi-
ous interference with the function of the jury in that it 
brought new elements to bear upon the facts and evidence 
which had been admitted in the case for their considera-
tion. 
In -contrast to this situation, however, is the case at ·i 
bar. Here the prospective juror admittedly knew noth-
ing of the facts of this case, and his statements about 
the fairness of insurance companies in dealing with 
claims were nothing more than general comments of an 
insurance salesman about the practices of insurance 
-companies and could not, by any stretch of the imagina- . l 
tion, be said to have rupplied to the facts of this case. 
The jury might have received just such comments by 
an examination of articles or advertisements in maga-
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zines or newspapers, or by hearing or seeing advertise-
ments on radio or television. To say that such informa-
tion, whether received in court or out of court, would 
effect the minds of a jury and cause them to violate 
their oaths and to disregard the evidence submitted to 
them in the case is to say that the oath of a man is worth-
less and that the orderly procedures of courts in the 
administration of justice are a sham and a mockery. 
"\Ve submit that since appellant has made no show-
ing of any kind of prejudice resulting from the state-
ments complained about, this court should not indulge 
in the unwarranted assumption made by appellant that 
prejudice was intended to result and did, in fact, result. 
However, even if it be said, for the sake of argu-
ment, that the statements by Mr. Barker were prejudi-
cial to appellant's case, the question of whether or not a 
mistrial should have been granted necessarily is deter-
mined by the question of whether or not the Trial Court 
abused its discretion. It has been the uniform rule that 
in matters relating to the conduct of the trial, the 
Trial Court has a wide discretion. It is usually referred 
to by appellate courts as "the sound discretion" of 
the Trial Court, and unless such discretion is clearly 
abused, courts have always been reluctant to reverse 
the ruling of an inferior court. 
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There have been cases in Utah which presented 
situations analogous, in legal :principle, to the case at 
bar. Most of these cases have been concerned with the 
problem of whether or not a new trial should have been 
granted because of misconduct of a juror or because of 
a claim of undue influence upon the jury. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the basic and guiding principles 
of those cases are applicable to the case at bar. 
In the case of Skeen vs. Skeen, 76 Utah 32, 287 Paci-
fic 320~ a person not officially connected with the trial, 
but who obviously was a close associate of plaintiff and 
plaintiff's coun~el, n1ade derogatory remarks concern-
ing the defendant, which remarks were claimed to have 
been made in the presence of some members of the jury. 
The remarks were such that, had they been believed, 
they would have adversely affected the chances of the 
defendant in the case inasmuch as they reflected upon 
his integrity and character which were interwoven in 
the issues presented to the court. 
In affirming the trial court's refusal to grant a 
new trial upon this ground, this Court said: 
"The granting of a new trial upon this ground '"I 
is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court, •,,; 
and it is generally held that a new trial will not 
be granted because of remarks about the case in 
the hearing of jurors by strangers to the litiga-
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tion where neither the successful party nor the 
jurors '"ere at fault, unless such remarks prob-
ably influenced the verdict.'' 
In Callahan vs. Simons, 64 Utah 250, 2:28 Pacific 
89:2, the question presented was whether or not a new 
trial should have been granted by the lower court 
because of prejudice which existed in the mind of a 
juror against a class of tradesmen whose occupations 
were similar to that of one of the parties, and which pre-
judice had not been made known by the juror during his 
voir dire examination. This Court disposed of the ques-
tion by stating: 
"The question of whether a new trial should 
be granted upon the ground of misconduct of a 
juror or that he was prejudiced is a question 
that largely rests in the sound legal discretion 
of the Trial Court, and appellate courts cannot 
interfere unless it is reasonably clear that the 
Trial Court has abused its discretion in refusing 
a new trial upon that ground." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
Other Utah· cases following this rule are Lund vs. 
District Court, 90 Utah 433; 62 Pacific 2nd 278, and 
Hepworth vs. Covey, 97 Utah 205; 91 Pacific 2nd 507. 
The general rule which has been followed by courts 
of most jurisdictions in the United States has been well 
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stated by the annotator in 86 A. L. R. 929, where it is 
said: 
''There are many cases where the misconduct 
of the jury is sufficient to require an order of 
mistrial, but the misconduct must be such as 
reasonably to indicate that a fair and impartial 
trial could not be had under the circumstances. 
The better rule in such cases would seem to be 
that such questions be left to the sound discre-
tion of the Trial Court, whose decision should be 
disturbed only in those cases where there has 
been a plain abuse of discretion, resulting ~n 
palp,able injustice." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The reason for the rule is obvious. The Trial Court 
is in a position to observe the demeanor of the jury and 
to hear, at first hand, the statements which are alleged 
to have prejudiced the jury. He sees the manner in which 
the statements are made. He hears the inflection of 
voice, and, while the statements are being made, his 
attention is concentrated upon the other members of 
the prospective jury, and he is thus able to determine 
whether the statements appear to have any undue effect 
upon the other members of the panel. 
So it was in this case. The Trial Court, being well 
aware that the question of insurance ordinarily should 
not he injected into a trial, was cloing his best to cope 
with a situation which had been brought about through 
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the fault of neither party nor Judge. The Court was 
aware that the injection of insurance into a case ordi-
narily reacts to the detriment of the defendant. He 
was likewise aware that undue emphasis upon the re-
marks of :.Mr. Barker might cause the jury to take more 
note of the ren1arks than would ordinarily be the case. 
After hearing the matter carefully, and after hearing 
comments from counsel in chambers, it was his opinion, 
in the exercise of his sound legal discretion, that no harm 
had been done and that the trial should proceed. 
As will be remembered by counsel for the appellant, 
the Trial Court, following his denial of the motion for a 
mistrial, made the comment that it was difficult for him 
to see how the remarks could have harmed one side of the 
case more than the other. We believe that counsel for 
appellant did not seriously believe that his cause had 
been harmed because, as has been pointed out heretofore, 
no request was made that the Court caution the jury 
about Mr. Barker's statements, and no questions were 
asked by counsel to determine whether or not the jury, as 
ultimately sworn, considered itself impartially capable 
of trying the case. 
Appellant, in grasping for some semblance of proof 
of prejudice in this case, urges that his argument is 
supported by the fact that respondent made no objec-
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tion to the statements by Barker. rrhis claim has no 
more basis than appellant's other assertions. 
Respondent did not object to the statements for the 
reason that it was felt, in view of all the circumstances, 
that any comment or objection would merely serve to 
give emphasis to Barker's statements and perhaps cause 
other members of the jury panel to give more attention 
to the colloquy than was then apparent. It was our 
belief then, as it is now, that no harm to either side re-
sulted from Barker's statements. 
Aside from legal principles, it appears to us that 
the logic of the situation requires affirmance of the rul-
ing of the Trial Court. If courts should be required to 
grant a mistrial because of facts or arguments which are 
·brought to the attention of the prospective members of a 
jury panel before a jury trial, ·there is no apparent 
place at which the line may be drawn. It would seem 
that the same sort of argument as made by appellant 
in this case could be made if members of the jury over-
heard similar statements in the corridor outside the 
courtroom before beginning of the court session, and 
if it could be then claimed that the statements heard in 
the corridor were favorable to an insurance company 
and that the legal and orderly proceedings of the trial 
court could be then nullified, there would seem to be 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
tittle purpvst• in the system of selection and iinpaneling 
of juries as it is now employed. 
CONCLUSION 
Since appellant has made no showing in this Court 
or in the Trial Court that the remarks of the prospec-
tive juror, Barker, were, in fact, prejudicial to the point 
of impairing the integrity of the verdict of the jury, and 
since there has been no attempt to show an abuse of the 
Trial Court's discretion in this matter, the ruling of the 
Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN H. SNOW 
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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